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CLOSING THE DOOR ON THE PUBLIC FORUM
The sound of tireless voices is the price we pay for the right to
hear the music of our own opinions. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
When is a street not a street? A sidewalk not a sidewalk? A public
bus not open to the public? These are questions for which the United
States Supreme Court has formulated an answer. According to the
Court, the government may regulate the freedom of speech2 in nearly any
manner, when the freedom is exercised in any public place that the Court
does not deem a "public forum"-including certain streets,3 sidewalks4
and advertising space on public buses.5
Streets, sidewalks and the like are-public property. Such property is
not owned by private parties who are at liberty to refuse admittance upon
their land; rather, it is property owned, funded and maintained by the
local, state or federal government. But, may people do whatever they
desire on the property simply because it is open to the public? What if
one person's activities interfere with another person's right to enjoy the
property?
Suppose some citizens of state X have grown tired of encountering a
particular organization in state X's publicly-owned airport. They say
that the group's members ask for donations and pass out literature, and
in so doing, the members disrupt the flow of pedestrian traffic in the air-
port. Others claim they do not like to hear the group's ritualistic chant-
ing. Still others just do not care to see the group's presence, highlighted
by their unique attire and unusual appearance. Finally, a portion of the
people simply do not like the group itself, the people in it or the beliefs
the group holds. The citizens urge the legislature of state X to pass a law
1. Adlai E. Stevenson, Address Before the State Committee of the Liberal Party at New
York City (Aug. 28, 1952), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON 63 (Walter Johnson
ed., 1974).
2. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment freedom
of speech applies to state and local governments as well, via the Fourteenth Amendment. See
infra note 47 and accompanying text.
3. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-37 (1976) (streets on military base).
4. See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990) (plurality opinion) (side-
walk in front of United States Post Office).
5. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (advertising placard
spaces on public buses).
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prohibiting soliciting and leafletting in airports. The political pressure
builds, motivating the legislature to acquiesce and ban the activity.
But what of the organization? Its members have a right to be in the
airport because it is open to the public.6 Under the First Amendment
they also have a right to ask for donations and distribute literature.7
Nevertheless, do they have a right to exercise their First Amendment
freedoms anytime, anywhere and in any manner they wish?
Usher in the public forum doctrine-a seemingly potent panacea
that promises to cure the tension between speaker and audience. The
public forum, a product of keen judicial invention, is a catch-phrase for a
type of public property that a reviewing court considers to be a place
where First Amendment rights may be exercised.8 Hence, if a court de-
termines that First Amendment activity9 is not appropriate in state X's
airport, then state X is effectively free to regulate the activity as it sees
fit. 10 Consequently, a conflict emerges between those who wish to be
heard and those who wish not to hear. For the good of society, whose
desire should prevail?
6. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704 (1992)
(stating that airport terminals "are generally accessible to the general public"); infra text ac-
companying notes 72-73.
7. Solicitation of funds and distribution of literature are recognized forms of "speech"
protected by the First Amendment. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981)).
8. See infra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
9. "First Amendment activity" in this context refers to expression protected by the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See supra note 2. Some expressive activity does not
enjoy First Amendment protection. See, eg., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)
(obscenity); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (words that incite violence or riot);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (" 'fighting' words").
Likewise, some expressive activity enjoys only limited First Amendment protection. See,
e-g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (plurality
opinion) (defamation of private individuals); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (commercial speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (indecent broadcasting); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 61 (1976) (nonobscene pornography); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (commercial speech); Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974) (defamation of private individuals); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defamation of "public officials"). Such
activity commonly is termed "low-value speech." See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1144-257 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing various forms of low-value
speech). Analysis of regulations on unprotected speech and low-value speech is beyond the
scope of this Note, as it does not invoke the public forum doctrine. See Carney R. Shegerian,
A Sign of the Times: The United States Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly
Tailored Requirement for Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 453,
470 (1992) (stating that Supreme Court uses "'sliding scale approach' to First Amendment
protection" depending on type of speech).
10. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
PUBLIC FORUM
The above hypothetical is patterned after an actual case involving
the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), a reli-
gious group that challenged a regulation prohibiting the group's
members from disseminating information about their organization to
passersby in New York area airports." This Note analyzes the United
States Supreme Court's decision in International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Lee, 2 which held that airports are not public fora.13 This
Note criticizes the manner in which the Supreme Court has incorrectly
applied the public forum doctrine in order to proscribe unwanted
speech. 4 Finally, this Note explores the real concerns underlying the
public forum doctrine and presents an alternative perspective to that ad-
vocated by the United States Supreme Court in Lee.'"
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Public Forum Trichotomy
A public forum is "an important facility for public discussion and
political process."' 6 The notion of what is thought of today as the public
forum originated in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.7
However, the foundation for the doctrine predates the term "public fo-
rum," which emerged in a line of Supreme Court decisions beginning
more than two decades later.'" By 1983, public forum analysis identified
three categories into which all public property could be placed: the tradi-
tional public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic fo-
rum19 (or more accurately, the public nonforum).20
11. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704 & n.1; see infra notes 65-102 and accompanying text.
12. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
13. Id at 2706; see infra notes 65-130 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 131-85 and accompanying text.
16. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr.
REV. 1, 11-12.
17. 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
18. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1221
& n.15 (1984). Professors Farber and Nowak note that the term "public forum" was first used
in International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), and then later in
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Farber & Nowak, supra, at 1221 n.15. The present
meaning of the term in the constitutional law lexicon was shaped by dozens of subsequent
Supreme Court cases, see id, and its evolution perhaps was hastened by Professor Kalven's
landmark article in 1965, see Kalven, supra note 16, at 10-21.
19. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrUIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 987 (2d ed. 1988).
20. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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Traditional or "quintessential public forums ' 21 are those types of
public property, such as streets and parks, that "have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions. 22 Because the First Amendment
demands that government not infringe the right to free speech,23 govern-
mental regulations on speech in traditional public fora are subject to a
high degree of scrutiny by the courts.24
The degree to which scrutiny is heightened generally is determined
by whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.25 If the
regulation restricts the content of the expressive activity, courts subject it
to strict scrutiny, requiring that the "regulation [be] necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and... narrowly drawn to achieve that end."26
If the regulation is content-neutral, however, the level of scrutiny
further depends upon the following two-part inquiry into the type of reg-
ulation. If the regulation acts as a blanket restriction on all speech, it
21. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
22. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
23. See supra note 2. The First Amendment freedom of speech applies to the state and
local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
24. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ('The right to use a public
place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons."); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) ("[J]ustifications for selective exclusions from a public fo-
rum must be carefully scrutinized.").
In constitutional analysis, "scrutiny" refers to how closely a court will analyze and ques-
tion a legislative act. The more a government regulation burdens or restricts an asserted right,
and the more importance the court assigns the asserted right, the closer the court will scruti-
nize the governmental act. That is, the court determines whether the societal interest fur-
thered by the act merits imposing a burden or restriction on an asserted constitutional right
and whether the methods used to achieve the interest justify burdening or restricting the as-
serted right. In First Amendment free speech analysis, courts essentially balance the speaker's
asserted interest against the government's asserted interest. See TRiBE, supra note 19, § 12-2,
at 792-93, § 12-24, at 987; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 820 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that public forum analysis dictates that
"[t]he interests served by the expressive activity must be balanced against the interests served
by the uses for which the property was intended and the interests of all citizens to enjoy the
property").
25. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. A content-based restriction is one that limits First Amendment
activity by focusing on what is being expressed-the message itself. See, eg., Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980) (invalidating statute that permitted dissemination of information
pertaining to labor disputes but prohibited discussion of all other issues); Mosley, 408 U.S. at
100 (invalidating ordinance allowing only labor picketing and not nonlabor picketing). Con-
verse.ly, a content-neutral restriction governs First Amendment activity by focusing on other
factors unrelated to the message. See, eg., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (dem-
onstration on large street during rush hour); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)
(two parades marching simultaneously on same street).
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
PUBLIC FOR UM
still is subject to strict scrutiny-the same level as that applied to con-
tent-based restrictions.27 However, if the regulation restricts only the
"time, place, and manner" of expressive activity, the courts will apply
mid-level scrutiny.28 When applying mid-level scrutiny, courts will up-
hold the regulation only if it is "narrowly-tailored to serve a significant
[as opposed to compelling] government interest, and leave[s] open ample
alternative channels of communication.
29
The other type of public forum is termed the designated, "limited
purpose or state-created semi-public forum[ ].,,30 This category "consists
of public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity."'" University meeting facilities, school
board meetings and municipal theaters are examples of designated public
fora.32 All restrictions on expression in designated public fora are subject
to the same levels of scrutiny applied in traditional public forum analysis,
as long as the state "retain[s] the open character of the facility."33
The critical difference between traditional and designated public
fora is that a traditional public forum is public property of the type that
has "been used for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions,"34 even though the
property was not dedicated for that purpose.35 Conversely, a designated
public forum is public property that the government itself opens up for
the very purpose of expressive activity.36 Often a designated public forum
is a limited purpose forum, designed to encourage discussion only on a
topic of narrow scope. For example, university meeting facilities may be
limited to student activities,37 and school board meetings may be limited
to discourse regarding education.3"
Public property that is neither "by tradition [n]or designation"3 9 a
27. Farber & Nowak, supra note 18, at 1221.
28. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
29. Id See Shegarian, supra note 9, for an analysis of the current status of time, place and
manner restrictions in public forum analysis.
30. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 12-24, at 987.
31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
32. Id.; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 & 267 n.5 (1981) (university
meeting facility); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1981) (temporary fair grounds); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1976) (school board meeting).
33. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
34. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added).
35. See infra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
36. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 & 46 n.7.
37. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
38. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
39. Id at 46.
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public forum is considered a nonpublic forum." This term is a misno-
mer, however, because the property is indeed public, but is not consid-
ered a forum for First Amendment activity.41 More appropriately, it is a
"public nonforum." 42 Restrictions on speech in a nonforum are subject
to low-level scrutiny; that is, the restrictions need only be reasonable and
not discriminatory against a particular viewpoint.43
B. The Evolution of the Traditional Public Forum
1. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization
The United States Supreme Court in Hague v. Committee for Indus-
trial Organization I declared that streets and parks constitute fora tradi-
tionally held open to public expression and dissemination of ideas. 45 In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Roberts further asserted:
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and lib-
erties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States
to use the streets and parks for communication of views on na-
tional questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regula-
tion, be abridged or denied.' s
This statement contains several pervasive themes. First, it stands
for the general proposition that the First Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47
40. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 18, at 1221.
41. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
131 (1981) (holding that mailboxes are not fora for First Amendment activity); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that military installations are not fora for First
Amendment activity).
42. This term helps to distinguish public nonfora from private property. The public forum
doctrine generally does not apply to private property. See International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992) (stating that public forum doctrine is used
"for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property" (em-
phasis added)). But see Shegarian, supra note 9, at 474 n.176 (noting that "[p]rivate property
has occasionally been viewed to be open to the public for First Amendment speech").
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
44. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
45. Id at 515 (opinion of Roberts, J.); see supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
46. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
47. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: "No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the Privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without Due Process
of Law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has expressly declared that the
[Vol. 26:241
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Second, Justice Roberts recognized that although First Amendment
protections are not absolute, they also may not be denied.48 This propo-
sition has evolved into the basis for the two-part test stated above:49
(1) blanket prohibitions are subject to strict scrutiny;"0 and (2) time,
place and manner restrictions must pass mid-level scrutiny."'
A third important theme is Justice Roberts' reference to "streets and
public places."5 2 The Hague opinion makes it apparent that the Court
intended its holding to encompass not only streets and parks, but other
public places as well. In Hague, the Court upheld an injunction re-
straining police officers from "interfering with [the respondents'] free ac-
Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to the states. Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50,52 n.1 (1976); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
237 (1963); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Hague, 307 U.S. at 519 (opinion of
Stone, J.); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
Notably, the Supreme Court chose not to make the First Amendment applicable to the
states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a sepa-
rate opinion in Hague, Justice Stone maintained:
It has never been held that either [the freedom of speech or the freedom of assembly]
is a privilege or immunity peculiar to citizenship of the United States, to which alone
the privileges and [sic] immunities clause refers... and neither can be brought within
the protection of that clause without enlarging the category of privileges and immu-
nities of United States citizenship as it has hitherto been defined.
307 U.S. at 519 (opinion of Stone, J.) (citations omitted). The distinction lies in the fact "that
freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured
to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id (opinion of Stone, J.). Hence, there are certain rights unique only to Amer-
ican citizens, and those rights are protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See id
(opinion of Stone, J.). Because First Amendment freedoms are "secured to all persons, with-
out regard to citizenship," id (opinion of Stone, J.), these freedoms are protected by the
broader Due Process Clause, not by the narrower Privileges or Immunities Clause.
48. The theory that First Amendment rights are absolute, making them free from any
governmental regulation, was proffered by Justice Hugo Black. See Konisberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 60 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 865, 874 (1960). Justice Black's view assumed that the Framers left no room in the First
Amendment for any compromises or judicial balancing and was premised on the belief that the
Constitution must be read literally.
However, the Supreme Court consistently has rejected Justice Black's "absolutist" view,
in favor of balancing First Amendment interests against governmental interests. See supra
note 24. In Hague, Justice Roberts alluded to the need for weighing the interests of both the
speaker and the state. See supra text accompanying note 46. Thus, there are times when free
speech concerns are outweighed by governmental interests. See infra notes 142-49 and accom-
panying text.
49. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
50. See, eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
51. See, eg., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Perry, 460 U.S. at
45; United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132
(1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980).
52. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (opinion of Roberts, J.) (emphasis added).
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cess to the streets, parks, or public places of the city."" Thus, the scope
of the holding stretches beyond streets and parks, to "public places" in
general. The opinion does not define, however, what constitutes a "pub-
lic place" for the purpose of public forum analysis.
2. Airport terminals as "public places"
Before the decision in International Society for Krishna Conciousness
v. Lee,54 the Supreme Court had never addressed whether an airport ter-
minal constitutes a public forum." When lower federal courts consid-
ered the issue, they almost unilaterally determined that airport terminals
fell within the realm of public fora.5 6 A recurring theme in those opin-
ions was that airport terminals are "comparable to city streets in both
physical and conceptual aspects," and like city streets, must be consid-
ered public fora.57
Nevertheless, in 1991, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Inter-
national Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee"3 flatly rejected the
principle that airports constitute public fora for First Amendment activ-
ity.59 The court determined that airport terminals are nonfora, arguably
fearing that the Supreme Court would overturn its decision if it affirmed
53. IM at 517 (opinion of Roberts, J.) (emphasis added).
54. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
55. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir.
1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
56. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572, 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992); see Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 987 (1988); Jews for Jesus v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir.
1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569 (1987); United States S.W. Africa/Nambia Trade
& Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter USSW
Africa]; Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S.
1124 (1982); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 268
(7th Cir. 1978); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 926 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131
(9th Cir. 1973); International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869,
872 (E.D. Wis. 1978); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Engelhardt, 425 F.
Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1977); see also Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Berger, 716 F.
Supp. 140, 149 (D.N.J. 1989) ("Newark Airport is a public forum."), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1990); cf Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir.)
(holding that bus terminal constitutes public forum), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). But see
International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. Dade County, 724 F. Supp. 917, 923 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (holding that airport terminals are not traditional public fora).
57. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 576; accord Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1283; USS WAfrica, 708 F.2d at
764; Chicago Area Military Project, 508 F.2d at 925; cf Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (stating that bus
terminals are akin to public streets).
58. 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
59. Id at 580.
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the district court's holding that airport terminals constitute public fora.60
Actually, the Second Circuit "was prepared to follow" the path taken by
the federal courts, recognizing the unified view of the circuits.6 How-
ever, analogizing to United States v. Kokinda,62 the Second Circuit de-
clared the airport terminal a nonforum, subject to "reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral" restrictions.63 In a fractured decision, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling."4
60. The court stated:
Prior to the decision in Kokinda, this panel was prepared to follow the authority
established in other circuits. To hold otherwise would have created a conflict among
the circuits over an issue that the Supreme Court has declined to address despite
numerous opportunities.... We believe, however, that Kokinda has altered public
forum analysis and that we would not be faithful to Supreme Court precedent if we
were to follow the other circuits.
Id. "Given the possibility of further review," id at 581, the court then examined the align-
ment of the Supreme Court's votes in Kokinda and attempted to predict how the Supreme
Court would rule in Lee. See id at 581-82. Thus, it appears that the court of appeals based its
decision primarily, if not exclusively, on its apprehension that the Supreme Court would re-
verse a finding that airports are public fora.
61. Id at 581. While the District Court for the Southern District of Florida earlier had
declared that airports are nonfora, International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. Dade County,
724 F. Supp. 917, 920 (S.D. Fla. 1989), this is the only pre-Lee decision espousing this posi-
tion. In International Caucus of Labor Committees, the court recognized the weight of author-
ity supporting the notion that airport terminals are public fora, id at 922-23, and then rebuffed
that view, id at 923. Judge Zloch inexplicably concluded that airport terminals are "not prop-
erty that 'by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly or debate,"'
thus rendering them nonfora. Id (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
It is unclear why Judge Zloch interpreted Peny's reference to the public forum definition
originated by Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), in a
manner contrary to the interpretations of every other circuit. The only authority cited by the
opinion that supports Judge Zloch's contention is a one paragraph concurring opinion written
by Justice White, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Board of Airport Commissioners
v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 577 (1987) (White, J., concurring). In Jews for Jesus, a unani-
mous Court struck down as overbroad a regulation banning all First Amendment activity in
Los Angeles International Airport. Id Justice White desired to limit the Court's holding so
as not to imply "that a majority of the Court considers the Los Angeles International Airport
to be a traditional public forum." Id (White, J., concurring).
That a majority of the Court did not in fact consider the airport to be a traditional public
forum is unstated in the Court's opinion; however, seven justices declined to join Justice
White's concurrence. It appears that Judge Zloch nevertheless saw the concurrence as an
indication that public forum analysis ought not recognize airports as public fora.
62. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
63. Lee, 925 F.2d at 580.
64. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
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III. INTERNATIONAL SocIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS V LEE
A. The Facts
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
65
ISKCON challenged a New York and New Jersey Port Authority regu-
lation that banned leaflet distribution and solicitation of funds anywhere
in the three airport terminals controlled by the Port Authority.
66
ISKCON is a religious organization that promotes the beliefs and views
of the Krishna religion.67 This is accomplished through the ritual of
sankirtan, whereby members solicit funds from and distribute literature
to the public.68 The solicited funds" 'are the very lifeblood and principal
means of support of [the] religious movement.' "69
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey owns and oper-
ates, among other facilities, three major airports in New York and New
Jersey.70 Most of the space in the airports is leased by commercial air-
lines.71 Those portions of the airports not held in leasehold (namely, the
interior areas of the terminals) are controlled by the Port Authority72
and are open to the public. 73 Numerous, varied commercial establish-
ments serve the public there.74
65. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
66. Id. at 2703-04. The regulation provided in relevant part:
"1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings
or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a
continuous or repetitive manner:
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to,
jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any other
printed or written material.
(c) Solicitation and receipt of funds."
Lee, 925 F.2d at 578-79 (quoting Port Authority regulation).
67. For a description of the history, beliefs and practices of the Hare Krishnas, see Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1981).
68. Lee, 925 F.2d at 577.
69. Id at 577-78 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
70. Id at 578. The three airports are John F. Kennedy International Airport, La Guardia
Airport and Newark International Airport.
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id The court of appeals described the many establishments conducting business in the
airport terminals at the time of the trial:
[T]he lobby of the International Arrivals Building at Kennedy included two res-
taurants, two snack stands, a bar, a postal substation and postal facility, a bank, a
telegraph office, a duty-free boutique, a drug store, a nursery, a barber shop, two
currency exchange facilities, a dental office, and an area for the display of art exhib-
its. Along the east and west corridors of that same building were some ten duty-free
shops, five bars, two snack stands, a telegraph office, two bookstores, two newsstands,
a bank, four travel insurance facilities, two currency exchanges, two cookie and
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In 1988, the Port Authority established a regulation that effectively
prohibited sankirtan in its terminal buildings." ISKCON brought an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.76 The District Court for the Southern District of New York heard
the case in 1989.7 7 A magistrate's report declared that the terminal areas
were public fora and that the regulation violated ISKCON's First
Amendment rights.7 8 The district court agreed with the magistrate's
findings and held that the regulation was unconstitutional.79 In accord
with all the other circuits in the country that had decided the issue of
whether airports are public fora,8 0 the court declared the airport termi-
nals are traditional public fora.8 ' The Port Authority appealed, and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the airport terminals
were nonfora and partially reversed the district court ruling."2 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision,
agreeing that airport terminals are nonfora 8 3
B. Reasoning of the Supreme Court
In a relatively curt opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court declared that airport terminals do not constitute public fora.84
candy shops, a cash and traveler's check machine, an India store, and a boutique-
sized Bloomingdale's. Similar establishments lined the lobbies and corridors of both
the Central Terminal Building at La Guardia and the North Terminal Building at
Newark.
iL
75. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992). See supra note 66 for the text of the regulation.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This law protects an individual from deprivation of constitu-
tional rights by any person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia." Id
77. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 572.
78. Id at 574.
79. Id at 579.
80. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
81. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 579. The district court recognized that the terminals are "the
functional equivalent of public streets," id at 577, and therefore "fit 'well within the notion of
traditional public fora,'" id (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 25-26).
82. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir.
1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
83. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1992).
84. Id Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas joined in this determination, form-
ing the five-member majority. Id at 2703. The Lee case actually was divided into two cases:
Case No. 91-155, in which the International Society for Krishna Consciousness was the Peti-
tioner, id. at 2701, and Case No. 91-339, in which Walter Lee, the Superintendent of Port
Authority Police, was the Petitioner, Lee v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness,
112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (per curiam). The main opinion is Chief Justice Rehnquist's, which
appears in Case No. 91-155. Id at 2703. The Court issued a per curiam opinion in Case No.
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The Court reasoned that "airport terminals have only recently achieved
their contemporary size and character" and thus lack the "tradition"
necessary to achieve traditional public forum status."5 Further, because
airport terminals had not been used for expressive activity such as leaflet-
ting and soliciting until even more recently, "the tradition of airport ac-
tivity" has not included expressive activity.
86
Basing its argument on dictum in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Education Fund,7 the Court asserted that a traditional public
forum "has as 'a principal purpose... the free exchange of ideas.' ,88
The majority then reasoned that if property does not have as a "principal
purpose" the free exchange of ideas, it is not a traditional public forum. 9
Because airports are not opened with the purpose of encouraging First
Amendment activity, they are not traditional public fora.9°
According to this reasoning, which is flawed at its core, 91 the
Supreme Court declared that airport terminals are nonfora.9a As such,
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on speech activity
occurring in the terminals.93 This means the state has virtually unfet-
tered power to regulate speech activity,94 because in a nonforum, the gov-
ernment need only assert a legitimate interest that will be served by a
restriction, and that restriction need only be rationally related to achiev-
91-339, id at 2710 (per curiam), to which Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices White, Scalia and Thomas, id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The analysis the Court used to arrive at the per curiam decision was set forth in several
separate opinions. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in both cases, id. at 2711
(O'Connor, J., concurring), as did Justice Kennedy, id at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment). Finally, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) filed an opinion
concurring in Case No. 91-339 (per curiam opinion) and dissenting in Case No. 91-155 (Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion). Id at 2724 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting). All of these
opinions are published separately from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion and the per curiam
opinion. Id at 2711. For purposes of clarity and brevity, all full citations made in this Note to
any opinion in Lee are made to the first page of the case, 112 S. Ct. 2701, and then to any
specific page or pages.
85. Id at 2706.
86. Id Given this reasoning, one would have to wonder how many years must pass before
an activity becomes bound up in "tradition."
87. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
88. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
89. Id
90. Id at 2707.
91. See id. at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). The Court wrongly assumed
that the government's purpose in opening up property to the public determines the nature of
the forum. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
92. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
93. See supra text accompanying note 43.
94. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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ing that goal.95 The Court will give deference to nearly any explanation
the government offers.
9 6
In keeping with the Supreme Court's recent history of stymieing as-
sertions that certain public property should be left open to expressive
activity,97 the Court streaked through the public forum doctrine on the
way to its prefabricated conclusion. Applying the reasonableness stan-
dard, the Court had no difficulty upholding the ban on solicitation.9"
The Court opined that the regulation was warranted because solicitation
can be disruptive and even coercive.99 However, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion only addressed the issue of solicitation."c°
A different alignment of five justices addressed the issue of leaflet-
ting and struck down the restriction as it pertained to that issue. 01 As a
consequence, leafletting is still allowed in the Port Authority's airport
terminals because, although terminals are nonfora, to restrict such activ-
ity would be unreasonable, absent any rational explanation for the
restriction. 102
95. See id. at 2713 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 2714 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (implying that only extremely broad restrictions would be struck down
under reasonableness standard).
97. See, eg., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990) (holding that side-
walk leading to entrance of United States Post Office is not public forum); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding that federally imple-
mented charity drive aimed at federal employees is not public forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983) (holding that public school's internal
mail system is not public forum).
98. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2708.
99. Id
100. See id Chief Justice Rehnquist's separate dissenting opinion stated that the restriction
on leafletting should be upheld. Id at 2710 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id at 2709-10 (per curiam). Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens
and Souter) and Justice O'Connor each wrote opinions stating that the prohibition of leaflet-
ting was invalid. See id at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); id at 2713
(O'Connor, I., concurring).
102. Id at 2714 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
Because I cannot see how peaceful pamphleteering is incompatible with the multi-
purpose environment of the Port Authority airports, I cannot accept that a total ban
on that activity is reasonable without an explanation as to why such a restriction
"preserv[es] the property" for the several uses to which it has been put.
Id. (O'Connor, 3., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50 (1983)). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Black-
mun, Stevens and Souter, stated that airport terminals are public fora and that the regulation
against leafletting was an invalid time, place and manner restriction. See id. at 2719 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Erosion of the Traditional Public Forum
When Lee reached the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit's proph-
ecy that the Supreme Court would declare airport terminals to be
nonfora10 3 came true. Two justices were replaced between the time the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Kokinda 1o (upon which the
court of appeals in Lee relied)' and the time it decided Lee. '6 The
newest justice, Justice Thomas, provided the crucial fifth vote forming
the majority that declared that airport terminals are nonfora. Hence, the
Second Circuit's conclusions were justified. Perhaps the lower court's
opinion was more a prediction of the future than an interpretation of the
past.
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is marred
by logical defects and inaccuracies. One glaring flaw is his assertion that
"the government does not create a public forum by inaction." 107 Quot-
ing a passage from Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund, 5 he claimed that a traditional public forum is created only "'by
[the government] intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse.' ,"o9 In fact, the passage from Cornelius that Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted referred explicitly to designated public fora!" ° Yet, he
103. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
104. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
105. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
106. Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan after the 1989 term; Justice Thomas replaced
Justice Marshall after the 1990 term.
107. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
108. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
109. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
110. Compare id with Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. In Cornelius, Justice O'Connor stated:
In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be created by government
designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for
assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain
subjects....
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse.... Accordingly, the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally
open to assembly and debate as a public forum.
Id. (emphases added) (citations omitted). Thus, Justice O'Connor was explicitly referring only
to designated public fora, not to traditional public fora as Chief Justice Rehnquist incorrectly
inferred. This is evidenced by three factors: (1) Immediately preceding the sentence quoted
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor discussed the subject of designated public fora;
(2) in the quoted sentence, she referred to the opening up of "nontraditional for[a]," which is
how designated, not traditional, public fora are created (a traditional public forum would not
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used this statement in an attempt to support his argument that, because
the government did not intentionally open the airports for public dis-
course, they are not traditional public fora."' The Chief Justice's decid-
edly myopic view of the public forum doctrine apparently led the
majority directly past the issue of airports as traditional public fora, and
straight to the issue of airports as designated public fora.
In effect, the majority opinion succeeded in so blurring the line be-
tween traditional and designated public fora that designated public fora
now encompass traditional public fora. The majority opinion asserts that
governmental inaction does not a public forum make.I12 However, such
an assertion is incorrect." 3 The Court's logic raises the question: If a
public forum exists only when the government makes it so, when did the
government open up streets and parks to be public fora? It never did.
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that these places are traditional
public fora." 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion ignores precedent and
misinterprets the public forum doctrine.
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,1 5 the Court
stated that property such as streets and parks are public fora because
they have been "used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.""' 6 However, Chief
Justice Rehnquist merely paid lip-service to this passage, which is the
foundation for public forum analysis, and instead based his reasoning on
the unfounded belief that the government's purpose in opening up prop-
erty dictates the nature of the forum. "' In doing so, the opinion shat-
tered any vitality the already languishing public forum doctrine might
have had left.
B. The Fallacy of "Purpose"
Another flaw in the majority opinion is the suggestion that the prin-
cipal purpose of a given piece of public property is the controlling factor
in determining whether the property is a public forum. The Court has
require such governmental action, because it is already "open"); and (3) immediately follow-
ing the quoted sentence, she discussed the government's role in deciding "whether it intend[s]
to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum." Id
(emphases added).
Ill. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
114. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
115. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
116. Id. at 515 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
117. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
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recently placed increased emphasis on the government's purpose in open-
ing up property to the public. 118 The entire issue of purpose derives from
a single line in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Education Fund:19 "Because a principal purpose of tradi-
tional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded
from a public forum" only if the restriction survives heightened scru-
tiny 2° In other words, the purpose of recognizing that certain public
property is a public forum is to prevent abridgement of the free exchange
of ideas.'
21
Contrary to what Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion proposes, public
property need not have as a principal purpose the free exchange of ideas
to be a traditional public forum.' 22 If his supposition were true, streets,
sidewalks and the like would not be traditional public fora, because their
principal purpose-the reason they exist-is not to promote the free ex-
change of ideas.12 Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Justice O'Connor's
statement in Cornelius 124 to bolster his assertion that the government
must have as an intended purpose the free exchange of ideas.'
2
In actuality, when Justice O'Connor stated that "[b]ecause a princi-
pal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas,"'
126
she was referring to the purpose "of those wishing to use the prop-
erty,"' 127 rather than the purpose of the government.1 2 That is why she
professed that restrictions on speech in public fora must survive height-
ened scrutiny: 29 because the people who are using the property have
118. See id. (stating that "traditional public forum is property that has as 'a principal pur-
pose ... the free exchange of ideas' ") (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Edue.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990)
(holding that sidewalk was constructed only to facilitate pedestrian traffic to and from post
office and thus was nonforum).
119. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
120. Id. at 800. See supra notes 25-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the vari-
ous levels of scrutiny applied in public forum analysis.
121. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
122. See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3129 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that postal sidewalk's
existence for access purposes is irrelevant because "public sidewalks, parks, and streets have
been reserved for public use as forums for speech even though government has not constructed
them for expressive purposes"); supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
123. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2717 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that "the
principal purpose of streets and sidewalks, like airports, is to facilitate transportation, not pub-
lic discourse"); supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
124. See supra text accompanying note 120.
125. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
126. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
127. I
128. See id.
129. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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constitutionally protected interests in that property-namely, the free ex-
change of ideas."' 0
Instead of properly interpreting the public forum doctrine to pro-
tect rather than proscribe First Amendment activity,131 the Court has
developed a mere cut-and-paste approach to constitutional analysis. By
extracting a few choice words (although seemingly innocuous in their
original context), twisting their meaning out of context, and reorganizing
them until a new doctrine has been created, the Rehnquist majority effec-
tively has drained the public forum doctrine of any meaning or useful-
ness. 13 2 Given this direction, it is a challenge indeed to imagine what
could possibly qualify as a public forum. Even the forum statuses of
streets, sidewalks and parks now lie in question.
1 33
C. Reworking First Amendment Analysis
The Supreme Court's application of the public forum doctrine, even
before Lee, has provided commentators with much to criticize. 34 Most
of the inquiry has centered on the Supreme Court's unwavering reliance
on rigid labeling and de-emphasis of the underlying First Amendment
concerns.' 35 These analyses have called into question the Court's con-
temporary application of the doctrine and have raised questions regard-
ing the validity of the concept of the public forum. 36 The Court's latest
decision in Lee provides an illustration of how the public forum doctrine
has been eviscerated, leaving only a hollow shell of a framework. Conse-
quently, the doctrine needs to be revisited by exploring the reasons for its
130. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
131. See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3127 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
134. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3127-28 & 3127 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrruTIoNAL LAW § 12-24, at 993 (2d ed. 1988); C. Thomas
Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 109, 110 (1986); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1219, 1234 (1984); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1715-16 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 93 (1987)).
135. See TRIBE, supra note 19, § 12-24, at 993; C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the
Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110
(1986); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis:
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1234 (1984);
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1715-16 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restric-
tions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 93 (1987).
136. See, eg., Dienes, supra note 135, at 110 (arguing that frameworks such as public fo-
rum doctrine "simply yield an inadequate jurisprudence of labels").
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existence and critiquing how well it has furthered its original objective of
preserving the freedom of expression.
137
1. Striking a balance
The public forum doctrine exists because so much of constitutional
law, and especially First Amendment law, has been reduced to multi-part
tests that theoretically serve as conduits for balancing governmental and
individual interests.13 As mere analytical shorthand, the public forum
doctrine emerged as a codification of sorts of the principle set forth by
Justice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.139
Did Justice Roberts, with his dicta in Hague, ever imagine that his
position of championing free speech in public places"4' would evolve into
a stringent formula that today has very little to do with preserving First
Amendment rights? On the other hand, in making reference to "public
places," 4 ' did he intend that airport terminals should be included in that
group? With an understanding of the policies behind balancing tests, one
may appreciate the growing need to reevaluate the public forum doctrine.
In much of constitutional law, balancing tests are the key to inter-
pretation. 42 Because First Amendment rights are not absolute, 4 3 line-
drawing obtains. However, the rights of the individual have been lost in
the Court's zeal to create easy, workable formulae into which all consti-
tutional questions may be inserted. As a result, rigid frameworks in gen-
eral, and the public forum doctrine in particular, ultimately focus on
semantic exercises instead of constitutional conflicts.
137. See Kalven, supra note 16, at 28 & n.91 (stating that Court should balance competing
interests " 'in order to protect, not to destroy, freedom of speech' ") (quoting Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).
138. See, ag., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
411-12 (1983) (establishing three-part test for resolving Contract Clause cases); Miller v. Cali-
fornia 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing three-part test for determining whether certain
speech is "obscene"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing three-part test for
resolving Establishment Clause cases); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(establishing three-part test for determining if restrictions on "symbolic speech" are constitu-
tional); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Edue. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 820 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that public forum doctrine is merely "analytical shorthand
for the principles that have guided the Court's decisions regarding claims to access to public
property for expressive activity").
139. 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see supra text accompanying note 46. See generally Kalven,
supra note 16 (developing concept of public forum to resolve free speech claims).
140. See supra text accompanying note 46.
141. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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The familiar example that falsely yelling fire in a crowded movie
theater is not protected speech"4 illustrates this point. By measuring the
speaker's relative-not absolute-right to falsely yell fire in a crowded
theater against society's interests in prohibiting such speech, the constitu-
tional question is quickly resolved. Few would disagree that society's
interest in preventing the panic that likely would ensue far outweighs the
speaker's right to yell fire."' 5 However, rather than stating that the
speech is not "protected speech,"'" the proper analysis is to recognize
that while the right to speak still exists, it is overcome by a compelling
governmental interest.
By refusing to allow a speaker to falsely yell fire while not proscrib-
ing the speaker's right to laugh or cheer or boo during a movie, the focus
is on the impact of the speech. This means speech that causes a degree of
danger might be squelched at the point that the danger outweighs the
right to speak those words. On the other hand, if there is no danger
sufficient to outweigh a particular type of speech, the interest in free
speech prevails. 147
Conversely, the person who yells fire in a burning movie theater car-
ries the same right to speak as does the person who falsely yelled fire.
However, while the speaker's status as speaker has not changed, society's
interests have now shifted. Of course, the same danger of panic is pres-
ent, but, this time, there is an added factor: the benefit conferred on
society by being warned of a fire. The speaker's right to speak and soci-
ety's interest in what is spoken, now outweighs society's interest in
preventing panic.
Thus, courts must apply balancing tests with regard not only to
what is said, but also to where it is said and to the circumstances under
which it is said. Identical speech is not always equally compatible with
all places and all times. 4 ' As Justice Marshall stated: "Although a si-
lent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, .. . making a
speech in the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech
should be perfectly appropriate in a park."' 49
144. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
145. See id
146. See supra note 9.
147. This is the essence of the definition of "balancing test." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIoN-
ARY 143 (6th ed. 1990).
148. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972).
149. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
November 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
2. Eliminating the "nonforum"
This discussion of balancing tests leads directly to the public forum
doctrine. The doctrine attempts to erect discernible hurdles, in an other-
wise murky pathway, that speech restrictions must overcome. More fun-
damentally, however, the doctrine has developed through judicial
(mis)interpretation from "a way of preserving First Amendment rights"
to "a means of upholding restrictions on speech."15
The problem with the public forum doctrine does not lie in the con-
cept itself, but rather, in the way the Supreme Court, through improper
application, has transformed it into a rigid framework."' In his dissent
in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,"5 2 Justice
Blackmun asserted that the public forum doctrine is not an end in itself;
rather, the categories serve as "but analytical shorthand for the princi-
ples that have guided the Court's decisions regarding claims to access to
public property for expressive activity." ' 3 As he saw it, the Court's pub-
lic forum analysis disregarded any inquiry into the appropriateness of a
forum as a place for expressive activity and instead employed the doc-
trine simply to identify property as nonfora and allow the government to
eradicate First Amendment activity taking place therein." 4
The doctrine's current rigidity has resulted from the advent of the
concept of the "nonpublic forum," or "public nonforum." 1 5 By adher-
ing to the idea of the nonforum, the initial aim of balancing tests is sub-
verted. Under the Court's rationale in cases such as Cornelius, the
government is effectively free to prohibit protected speech in a public
nonforum.15 6 The significance of the speaker's interest or society's inter-
est is of no consequence to the Court."'7 Nor is it at all important
whether the property at issue might be compatible with First Amend-
ment activity. Consequently, as Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in
150. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3127 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. See id (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I have questioned whether public forum analysis, as
the Court has employed it in recent cases, serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at
hand."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 821 (1985) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) ("Rather than taking the nature of the property into account in balancing
the First Amendment interests of the speaker and society's interests in freedom of speech
against the interests served by reserving the property to its normal use, the Court simply labels
the property and dispenses with the balancing.").
152. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
153. Id at 820 (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
154. See id at 820-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that government need only show
rational basis for restrictions in nonfora).
155. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
156. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Kokinda,5 8 "these public forum categories- originally
conceived as a way of preserving First Amendment rights-have been
used in some of our recent decisions as a means of upholding restrictions
on speech."1" 9 Justice Brennan's comment illuminates the present public
forum problem. Accompanying changes in the makeup of the Supreme
Court over the last two decades"6 is the Court's increased willingness to
label public property as nonfora, thereby eliminating the right to speak in
many public places.
One conspicuous example of this is the plurality decision in Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights.161 In Lehman, a plurality of the Court held
that advertising space on city-owned buses was a nonforum. 62 The city
had opened poster card spaces on its buses for advertisements, but it did
not allow political advertisements. 63  Thus, while the government
opened a forum for the principal purpose of expressive activity, it dis-
criminated on the basis of content by prohibiting political messages.
As stated previously, 1 4 when the government opens a public
place-such as placard space on a public bus-for the purpose of expres-
sive activity-such as advertising, whether or not commercial in na-
ture-it creates a designated or limited public forum.165 Ironically, the
Court in Lehman declared the card space a nonforum,1 66 thus upholding
a restriction on what some consider to be the highest order of expressive
activity-political speech.167 As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent:
"A forum for communication was voluntarily established when the city
installed the physical facilities for the advertisements and.., created the
necessary administrative machinery for regulating access to that
forum."
168
158. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
159. Id. at 3127 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
160. Since 1969, 10 justices have been elevated to the Supreme Court, and all have been
appointed by Republican Presidents. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAK-
ING oF THE REHNQUisr SuPREME COURT 4, 453 (1992). This has resulted in a shift in the
Court's collective First Amendment ideology-from "liberal" (broadly interpreting First
Amendment rights) to "conservative" (narrowly interpreting First Amendment rights). See
generally id at 453-56 (stating that Court, especially during Reagan and Bush years, has in-
creasingly taken to narrowly construing Bill of Rights).
161. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
162. Id at 304 (plurality opinion).
163. Id at 299-300 (plurality opinion).
164. See supra text accompanying note 31.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
166. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
167. See, eg., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("For speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.").
168. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Instead of weighing the competing interests claimed by the speaker
and the government, the Court in Lehman simply labeled the property as
a nonforum and facilitated virtually unrestricted government interfer-
ence with the speaker's rights. 169 This approach ignores free speech in-
terests while elevating the government's interests. Instead, courts should
balance free speech interests and governmental interests with regard to
any public property to which access is sought, thereby conducting a com-
plete inquiry into the validity of a law. Justice Blackmun recognized
that, by weighing the speaker's rights and society's interest in promoting
free speech "against the 'other interests inhering in the uses to which the
public property is normally put,"' First Amendment concerns are ade-
quately addressed and analyzed.17
Necessarily, the public forum doctrine has no room for the public
nonforum category, because all public property has the potential to be a
public forum. The concept of the "nonforum" serves no purpose in First
Amendment analysis. It actually subverts the very purpose of the First
Amendment; for where the First Amendment is an encumbrance on the
government's power to restrict speech, the concept of the nonforum ex-
ists solely to impede the individual's right to speak.171
Because the government may not abridge free speech, 172 unless its
interest in doing so sufficiently outweighs the speaker's and society's in-
terest in free speech, 173 whether the speech takes place in a "public fo-
rum" or "nonforum" is irrelevant. All public property is property
subject to governmental regulation, and all governmental regulations are
subject to the United States Constitution. 74 Because proper constitu-
169. See id. at 304 (plurality opinion).
170. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 816 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Blackmun then detailed what ought to be considered in conducting a
proper balancing test:
The result of such balancing will depend, of course, upon the nature and
strength of the various interests, which in turn depend upon such factors as the na-
ture of the property, the relationship between the property and the message the
speaker wishes to convey, and any special features of the forum that make it espe-
cially desirable or undesirable for the particular expressive activity.
Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, while the nature of the property-its physical charac-
ter-is to be considered in balancing, it is only one of many factors. Physical character should
not be dispositive in resolving a First Amendment challenge to a regulation restricting speech
on the property. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990) (plurality opinion)
("The mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis.").
171. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 2.
173. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
174. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
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tional interpretation requires balancing competing interests, 17 drawing
false lines between types of property is inappropriate.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The public forum doctrine should be abandoned in its entirety.
Pigeonholing different types of property into one of three categories only
diverts attention away from, and "confuses the development of[,] First
Amendment principles."'176 By recognizing that any restrictions on
speech in any public property should be subjected to balancing tests in-
stead of type-of-forum tests, the emerging analysis would be more ra-
tional, logical and attuned to the concerns of all parties involved in a
dispute, including the speaker, the audience, the government and society.
Professor Tribe notes that "[o]ften, the central issue is... the nature of
the restriction, not the forum."'" Yet, the Court's persistent focus on
the type of forum has caused expressive activity to be trampled underfoot
by an illogical bright-line test.'
In applying a balancing test, instead of the public forum doctrine, to
the regulation at issue in International Society for Krishna Consciousness
v. Lee,'"I the broad proscription on speech must fail. The regulation pro-
hibited all forms of selling and distributing literature and soliciting
funds.' 80 Of course, there is little doubt that unrestricted expressive ac-
tivity has the potential to create substantial pedestrian traffic problems in
any busy milieu, be it a street, sidewalk or airport terminal, and society
has an interest in preventing such problems. However, a complete prohi-
bition is neither necessary nor reasonable.' 8 '
For example, by merely restricting such activity to certain areas of
an airport terminal, any disruptive effect on pedestrian traffic likely
would be relieved. 8 2 How this might be accomplished depends, of
course, on the circumstances involved in the particular situation. The
size of the group, the type of activity and the location of the areas that
can accommodate expressive activity are all relevant considerations.8 3
After all, freedom of expression in public fora "is not absolute, but rela-
175. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
176. Farber & Nowak, supra note 18, at 1223.
177. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 12-24, at 993 n.41.
178. See id. § 12-24, at 993.
179. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
180. See supra note 66 for the text of the regulation.
181. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
182. See id (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (advocating use of reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions rather than flat prohibitions).
183. See supra note 170.
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tive, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must
not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." 1 '4
Labeling property is unnecessary and irrelevant in resolving free
speech claims. Rather, courts should direct attention to the competing
interests of speaker, audience, government and society. By examining
these interests and then scrutinizing the severity of the restriction on
speech, such cases may be properly resolved. The nature of the forum is
only germane to the issue of the government's interest in preserving the
property for its intended uses, and this interest must be further balanced
against the interests of the speaker and society.
In his seminal article, Professor Kalven suggested the implementa-
tion of, "in effect[,] a set of Robert's Rules of Order for the new uses of
the public forum." 185 The employment of narrowly tailored time, place
and manner restrictions serves this aim. The government must allow for
expressive activity on public property, to the extent that such activity
does not unduly hamper the flow of other activity on the property. Be-
cause expressive activity may have the potential to interfere with other
activity, and because the government certainly has an interest in preserv-
ing its property, time, place and manner restrictions may be promulgated
to relieve such burdens. Only through time, place and manner restric-
tions may a true balance be struck. Blanket proscriptions on speech ig-
nore the speaker's undeniable rights; no restrictions lead to chaos and
mob rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Not everyone enjoys being approached by a person who wishes to
impart his or her views to the public's eyes and ears. Nonetheless, toler-
ance of others is an essential quality in a free society that supposedly
encourages an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 18 6 exchange of
ideas and viewpoints. When the government encroaches on our most
jealously guarded right-the right to express one's self freely-we must
question not the speaker's actions, but rather, the government's actions.
It is simple to believe that the government is acting for the common
good by prohibiting expressive activity when it perceives performance of
that activity to be a threat to peace and order. Protecting public har-
mony is a worthy endeavor for the government to undertake, and the
184. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
185. Kalven, supra note 16, at 12.
186. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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legislature's role is to bow to the will of the majority. On the other hand,
it is vitally important to preserve the rights of the individual, and the
function of the courts is to protect the individual's constitutionally guar-
anteed freedoms from oppression by the majority. Consequently, the ju-
diciary must not be quick to assume that the legislature is acting properly
when lawmakers foreclose the rights of the unpopular."8 7 The day may
come when the masses arrive at the steps of a "public forum" to express
their views, only to find the door has been closed, and they are without
the key.
Michael A. Scherago*
187. See generally David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases" Misplaced
Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BuFF. L. REv. 175 (1983) (arguing that public
officials often overregulate out of fear of public disruption and controversial viewpoints).
* I dedicate this Note to my parents, Robert and Marcia Scherago--without whom,
nothing would be possible, and because of whom, nothing is impossible.
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